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Abstract 
Most of the critical decisions are made in the front-end stage of projects. This is due to high level of uncertainty in 
this stage (both negative and positive uncertainty) and at the same time the high potential for corrective actions and 
reducing consequences of possible negative impacts. On the other hand the prerequisites of a project’s success 
include those aspects which should be in order and those matters that need to be attended to in the initial phases of the 
project. At this stage, attempting to detect early warning signals of possible future problems can be an aid to making 
the right decisions and ensuring the existence of crucial requirements. The earlier the warning signals are identified, 
the more time will be available for taking appropriate corrective actions before the negative consequences of a 
problem show up. This article suggests that it can help to introduce new insights to adding early warning 
identification as part of the management process in the front-end stage of projects. A case study on the Norwegian 
High Speed Railway project, which is currently in its front-end stage, is done in order to better illustrate the key 
points of this research. This will be done through an analysis on the possible early warning signs which can be 
detected in this stage and showing how this can contribute to a more effective decision making process for the 
project. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most important phases of a project is the front-end phase, which is when the project exists 
only conceptually, before it is planned or implemented. It includes the entire set of activities from 
decision on the initial concept to the final decision for financing the project (Williams & Samset, 2010). 
In this stage resources should be expended without guarantee of return. The best project management 
practice is needed in this period to ensure that resources are spent as effectively as possible in order to 
provide highest likelihood of return (Morgan, 2002). At this point the complete project should have come 
together as one integrated whole, building the best fit with it market, environment, community and the 
corporate strategy of its sponsor (Morgan, 1987). Front-end decision making for projects according to 
Samset (2010) is very important since the need to “do the right project” is just as important as to “do the 
project right”. During this phase, it is essential to have a broad perspective on the project and its features 
which are relevant for various stakeholders. It is also very important to take into account the uncertainty 
involved with the project’s objectives and strategic framework. When it comes to large-scale public 
projects, with high level of complexity and risk, it is very important to spend enough time and effort on 
the front-end phase since the costs of changes are very high. Jergeas (2008), in his study states that the 
solution to preventing cost-over runs in large capital oil sand construction projects is having more focus 
on the front end planning phase. 
It is obvious that due to the high level of uncertainty in this stage, it is not easy to identify early 
warning signs of potential problems which may arise during the project. But attempting to select the right 
approaches for indicating the early warning signs of possible problems will be a highly effective aid to 
project managers for making the right decisions, thus avoiding undesired events later in the project. 
The objective of this paper is to examine how identification of early warning signs in the front-end 
phase of projects can contribute to a more effective decision making process. It suggests that adding early 
warning identification as part of the management process, in the front end stage, can help in having better 
insights towards the future of the project. A real case of a project, in its front-end phase, in the railway 
industry will be used as an example to better illustrate the main goal of this study. 
The paper is structured around several main issues. The first concerns the phenomenon of early 
warning and different approaches for early warning detection being discussed. Secondly, the case on 
Norwegian high speed train will be briefly discussed and analyzed. An investigation on possible early 
warning signs that can be detected will be performed. Lastly the effects of early warning identification in 
project’s front-end phase on the decision making process will be discussed. 
2. Early Warnings in Projects at the Front-end Stage 
The general idea of early warning is a broad concept. It applies to almost any area where it is important 
to obtain indications as early as possible of some development that in the future will become clearer, 
usually of a negative nature. The concept of early warning in a management context was first discussed 
by Ansoff in 1975 and was later supported by Nikander (2002) in his doctoral dissertation. Ansoff stated 
that strategic surprises do not appear out of the blue, it is possible to predict their occurrence by the aid of 
signs which are called weak signals. A weak signal was defined by him as “…imprecise early indications 
about impending impactful events…all that is known is that some threats and opportunities will 
undoubtedly arise, but their shape and nature and source are not yet known” (Ansoff, 1984). 
In Nikander’s words (2002), “an early warning is an observation, a signal, a message or some other 
item that is or can be seen as an expression, an indication, a proof, or a sign of the existence of some 
future or incipient positive or negative issue. It is a signal, omen, or indication of future developments”. 
In his study he devises a preliminary model illustrating the character of the early warnings observations. 
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This model sees project events as a time-bound consecutive stream of events. At a given moment, 
information about this stream can be obtained (e.g. early warnings of potential future project problems). 
This information is processed and responses are required in order to influence the flow of the project. A 
crucial factor in choosing a response appears to be, according to Ansoff, time available for responses 
before the potential problem significantly impacts the project.  
Not much has been mentioned in the literature about the exact time the early warning sign 
identification should start in the project life cycle. We believe that in case early warning signals are 
identified in the front-end stage of a project, the available time will be rather long enough for project 
managers to take the right actions in the subsequent stages of project. For example in case some warning 
signals related to cost and time limitation are identified in the front-end stage, budget estimating in the 
initiation phase can be done more accurately. In addition, it can be a guide to planning deliverables, 
baseline schedule and baseline budgets in the planning stage. Identification of early warning signs related 
to technical issues, can aid the responsible persons to make better decisions on risk management and 
production of key variables in the execution phase. Of course the challenge lies in the possibility of 
detecting the early warning signs and their level of reliability. 
According to Nikander (2002), very little literature exists that deals explicitly with early warning in 
projects and project management. But the project management literature does include some statements 
which directly or indirectly refer to this concept and its identification approaches (See Table 1). 
Table 1. Categorization of sources of early warning signs in projects 
Early warning sources directly discussed in the literature Potential Early warning sources in-directly discussed in literature 
Risk analysis (Niwa (1989); Nikander (2002)) Stakeholder analysis (Savage et al. (1991); Cleland (1986)) 
Project success / failure models (Pinto & Slevin (1988); 
Miller & Lessard (2000)) 
Cause / effect analysis (Parker & Skitmore, (2005); Sambasivan & 
Soon (2007); Klakegg et al. (2010)) 
Project assessment methods (Cooper (2005); Miller & 
Lessard (2000); Klakegg et al. (2010)) 
Maturity assessment (Andersen & Jessen, 2003; Ahern et al. 
(2004); Jachimowics (2003); Kerzner (2001)) 
Earned value management (Vanhoucke (2010)) Interface analysis (Cleland & Morris (1988); Voss (2012)) 
Decision support model of early warnings (Nikander & 
Eloranta, 2001) 
Extrapolation from previous projects (Pinto & Slevin (1988); 
Miller & Lessard (2000); Kappelman et al. (2007); Klakegg et al. 
(2010)) 
 Gut feelings (Nikander & Eloranta (2001); Klakegg et al. (2010); 
Whitty (2010)) 
The choice of the right approach is very much dependent on the project itself, the project organization 
and the project context. Detailed description of each approach is out of this paper’s scope. In the next 
section, the case of the Norwegian high speed railway project, which is in its front-end stage, will be 
introduced and subjected to analysis. The reason this case has been chosen is that it is an example of a 
complex project, involving a great number of stakeholders which can highly influence the project in all its 
phases. We would like to discuss this case in order to identify what are the possible problems that may 
arise during the project and what are the possible early warnings signs that can be identified in the 
project’s current stage. We would like to discuss how these findings can potentially aid the project 
responsibles to a more effective decision making process later on. Note that, due to the public being one 
of the main stakeholders in this project, the information published on this case is clear, detailed and 
precise. Our findings are based on a document analysis on published assessments of the feasibility study 
on this project in addition to semi-structured interviews with the project manager of the feasibility study 
project. 
215 Sara Haji-Kazemi et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  74 ( 2013 )  212 – 222 
3. Identification of Early Warnings in a Project in its Front-end Phase , A case study 
As mentioned earlier, the front-end of a project is basically defined as the period from when an idea is 
conceived to where the decision to finance the project is actually made. This is the point where the 
complete project should have come together as one integrated whole, building the best fit with it market, 
environment, community and the corporate strategy of its sponsor (Morgan, 1987). We would like to 
utilize in this study the framework designed by Samset (2010) for strategy analysis which leads us to a 
clear picture of the probable consequences of a choosing specific solution. This approach applies a 
simplified framework for identification of the most important elements of a project. It presents an overall 
picture of the project strategy and the main uncertainty factors which can influence the project 
implementation. Determination of the most important uncertainties leads us to identification of the most 
probable problems that may rise in the project and guide us to attempt for detecting the early warning 
signs of those specific events. In the next two sections, a brief description of the case project will be 
performed followed by introducing the potential problems, based on the uncertainty elements, and their 
possible early warning signals 
3.1. A case of a project in its initial phase (HSR Project) 
The Norwegian high-speed railway project which is one of the major investment projects intended to 
be carried out for the first time in Norway has absorbed lots of attention from public and media in the 
recent years (2010-2012). Since many stakeholders are involved with this project, there are a variety of 
opinions on whether it should or should not be executed. 
The feasibility study project for the Norwegian high-speed railway was given its mandate by the 
Norwegian Rail Administration (Jernbaneverket) in February 2010, with a total budget of 50 million 
Norwegian kroners and was intended to be carried out in order to provide recommendations on long-term 
strategies that will form the basis of long distance passenger traffic in Norway and for exploring 
opportunities for building high speed railways in southern Norway.  
The final report was published in February 2012 concluding that it is possible to build and operate 
high-speed trains in Norway and it has a large endpoint and future market. Although the development 
costs are significant for all options, they vary greatly according to the length of tunnels in different 
section. Corporate economy is positive for most of the routes but social economy is negative for all 
sections. From the environmental point of view, it is concluded that the number of years to achieve CO2 
emissions balance varies greatly with the length of tunnels of the different sections. The study has shown 
that 30-40% of traffic on the routes is known along the way traffic, i.e. passengers who drive between 
endpoints. A possible realization of the high speed railway will shorten travel time for the population in 
regions and districts between the major cities in a significant way. In case of realization it should be 
performed in a way that people living between major cities can also benefit from it.  
The concluding remarks consist of analysis on specific factors including technical feasibility, 
investment, market conditions, socio- economics, business, environment and safety. In the next section 
we will analyze the case and try to point out to possible early warning signs of potential problems which 
may come up in later stages of the project. This will be based on the information provided in the final 
assessment published by the Norwegian Rail Administration. 
3.2. Uncertainty elements of the HSR project 
Having studied the published reports on the Norwegian high-speed rail project, we have extracted the 
uncertainties involved with different aspects in the project in order to identify the potential problems 
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which may rise during the project. a total of 53 uncertainty elements have been identified in various 
aspects such as technical feasibility, climate factors, travel time, market, safety and security, development 
costs and environmental issues (See Table 2). 
Table 2. Uncertainty elements in Norwegian High Speed Railway Project 
Category Uncertainty elements 
- Technical feasibility  
- Climate factors 
1. Suspension bridge over the Hardangerfjørd with a length of 1.6 km in Oslo-Bergen rout is feasible 
2. 2 tube tunnel under Hardangerjøkuln in Oslo – Bergen rout 
3. 2 tube tunnel under Boknafjørd with a length of 51 km in Stavanger-Haugesund rout is feasible 
4. Underground portion of over 50% in Oslo-Trondheim rout is feasible 
5. Establishing technological standards alongside the rapid development of international practice is 
feasible 
6. Climate change is not so vast to require new technological solutions 
7. The need for compatibility to Swedish lines does not require completely new, out of the scope 
technological solutions 
8. Land wasting are detected early enough 
9. Bed rocks are in good conditions so the rails can be built on them 
10. Diagnosing in advance probability of water leakage in places where tunnels are intended to be 
constructed 
- Travel time 
- Market 
- Safety & Security  
- Business 
- Development costs 
11. Travel time is approximately 3,5 hours in all corridors in order to make replacement of flights 
beneficial 
12. Number of passengers is adequate in all the routes 
13. The investment pays back in good time  
14. Socio economic value is positive 
15. Cost of the project is reasonable and worth the service its providing 
16. Development of labor market is satisfactory due to easier means of transportation between towns and 
large cities 
17. Community acceptance is satisfactory 
18. The HSR can operate safely under harsh climate of Norway 
19. Distribution of population over time is relevant to the need of HSR 
20. Travel duration is convenient and pleasant for passengers 
21. Business travellers needs over time is still in alignment with the need for HSR in specific routes 
22. Number of people working and living in different areas is relevant to the need of HSR 
23. Employment growth in different areas is relevant to the need for HSR 
24. Public reaction to public funding required for construction of HSR is positive 
25. Passengers perception of use of HSR is positive 
26. Inflations and change of interest rates does not affect the project costs in a negative way 
27. World economy will not change in a manner which can negatively affect the project 
28. Government policy does not turn negative against the project 
29. Road improvements and new technologies does not decrease the public interest in HSR 
30. Changes in legislations during HSR development and construction does not stop the project 
31. Change in EU policies does not affect the project costs and scope ( For example immigration laws 
preventing use of foreign contractors from outside EEU)  
32. Communities in Norway approve the plans 
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Category Uncertainty elements 
33. Low rate of level crossing accidents 
34. Low rate of tunnel accidents 
35. Few fatalities during the construction phase (less than 11 fatalities per year for the total railway net) 
36. few accidents due to collision with wild animals crossing the rail lines 
37. less than 2 accidents per 10 years with local people living near the railway area 
38. No successful terroristic accidents 
39. No serious accidents due to fire 
40. No serious accidents due to violence and sabotage actions  
41. No detonation accidents in the tunnels 
42. No bombing accidents near the rail lines  
Environmental issues 43. Transfer of air traffic and road traffic to HSR is significant 
44. Environmental balance is achieved in good time  
45. Intervention effects on natural environment, cultural heritage, landscape, natural resources and society 
is not too high 
46. Amount of CO2 emission due to tunnelling is acceptable 
47. Amount of CO2 emission while the HSR in operation is acceptable 
48. Amount of noise produced by HSR is not disturbing for people living in the area surrounding the places 
where train passes 
49. Amount of GHG emission per unit of traffic is acceptable  
50. Amount of GHG is decreased due to high volume of traffic transferred from air 
51. Public reaction to environmental effects from construction of HSR is positive 
52. The HSR is more environmental friendly than air transport 
53. New technologies such as hybrid cars, low hazard fuels for air planes etc. do not replace this solution 
Assuming that all the uncertainty elements in the above table are more risk- oriented rather than 
opportunity oriented, we will continue our discussions taking into account these elements as risk elements 
of the project (According to Chapman and Ward (2003) the negative side of uncertainty is considered as 
risk). We can interpret that each of the uncertainties mentioned in table 2 as potential problems in case of 
occurrence on the negative side. The main purpose of the Norwegian HSR project is mentioned to be an 
environmental friendly solution for transportation despite the huge amount of development costs. The 
question will be now what can be the early warning signs to these risks in the front end stage of the 
project? It is also a challenge to identify early warning signs of which category of problems can mainly be 
determined in this stage. The analysis will be done in the following section. In this section we would like 
to try to point out to the possible early warning signs of problems which can be identified in the front-end 
stage of the project. Each category of problems will be analysed separately. 
Problems related to technical feasibility and climate factors 
In the report containing summary of phase 2 works (Norwegian high speed rail assessment 2010-2012, 
Summary of phase 2 works, Jernbaneverket, 26.02.2011) it is mentioned that when new high-speed 
railway lines are planned, robust and reliable infrastructure should always be the main goal. This includes 
bridges, tunnels and protecting embankments in places where the surrounding nature and climatic 
conditions are particularly demanding. In a few cases though, it is not technically or economically 
possible to build such infrastructure. In these cases an early warning system (EWS) could be an option. 
EWSs are built to monitor the ground conditions, and give warnings as early as possible when land 
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wasting happens. This can give the railway operator a few valuable seconds to protect the running of 
trains on the railway line. In most cases the train can be stopped on prepared stopping points before it 
runs into the problem area. In some rare cases, the train will not be able stop at all, but should at least be 
able to slow down the speed to reduce the damage to equipment and injuries to people. 
Although the concept of early warning has been mentioned in this report, approached for detection of 
these signs in the front-end stage of the project are not pointed out. We believe that the early warning 
signs of technical and climate oriented problems cannot be detected before the planning phase starts. This 
project has been estimated to start earliest in year 2017. It is obvious that factors such as conditions of bed 
rocks, amount of land wasting and climate factors cannot be predicted now and detection of early warning 
signs related to this issues should be done shortly before execution of the project. Results of the 
assessment also show that there is the risk that some unknown problems arise, which cannot be foreseen 
before the execution starts. 
Problems related to Travel time, Market, Safety & Security, Business and Development costs 
The results of the assessments show negative socio-economic values (Konklusjoner og oppsummering 
av arbeidet I fase 3, 2012). This can strongly affect the decision of the political parties which should make 
the final agreement in order for this project to be executed. There may be arguments on ways for better 
use of public funding which includes education, elderly health care, etc. Also it is important to point out 
that the result of the feasibility study show that it takes 60 years for investment payback which proves the 
project is almost never economically viable. This can be an early warning sign for the project not 
reaching its goals. 
The high amount of underground portion of the project is also a great weakness. Despite its huge 
development costs, in case of accidents can cause to sever deadly consequences. This can be another early 
warning to causing problems such as inadequate number of passengers in all the routes due to 
inconvenient and unpleasant travel time for passengers. 
According to the interview done by the project manager of the feasibility study project, an SPA 
analysis was made by Atkins Consultant Company by distributing questionnaires to 10000 people among 
those who either travel or intend to travel within the planned train routes. 3100 out of 10000 gave positive 
answers. The main uncertainty is we never know what will be the real number of people intending to use 
this technology when it comes to practice. Learning from other similar project can be good help in 
estimating how credible the result of these questionnaires is. Same type of analysis has been done in 
France but it turns out that 8 out of 10 HSR trains in France have fewer passengers than estimated. We 
believe this can also be another early warning sign for lack of adequate number of travellers in all the 
routes. 
The final assessments of the feasibility study show that in case the travel time is approximately 3.5 
hours in all corridors, replacement of flights becomes a beneficial option for travellers. But according to 
another SPA done by Atkins Consultant Company, 70% to 80% of passengers will prefer this train to 
airplane only in case the travel time is 3 hours. If the travel time increases to 3.5 hours, half of the people 
will go back to taking planes as their first priority. This is also an early warning sign of lack of interest of 
public towards the high speed railway. 
Despite the mentioned issues above, we believe that other problems such as changes in legislations 
during HSR development and stopping the project, changes in EU policies negatively affecting the project 
costs and scope and changes in world economy in a manner which can negatively affect the project, are 
issues which should be considered in the planning phase in order to detect the possible early warning sign 
of their occurrence. Although looking at trends may help, but the uncertainty level in these cases is so 
high that the information extracted from the historical trends will not be reliable for making any 
decisions. 
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Problems related to environmental issues 
As the main purpose of the Norwegian HSR project is mentioned to be an environmental friendly 
solution for transportation despite the huge amount of development costs, the problems related to 
environmental issues are of great importance. In case of environmental friendliness, although the results 
of the feasibility study show that in 60 years the CO2 emission caused by HSR will be less compared to 
other transportation means altogether (Flights, cars, classic rails and coaches), we believe this can only be 
acceptable in case HSR will be the one and only means of transportation which is far from the truth. Also 
Since in some routes more than 50% of the railway will be installed underground; there will be a huge 
amount of environmental hazards due to the construction of tunnels. These can be considered an early 
warning signs to problems such as negative public reaction to environmental effects from construction of 
HSR and more importantly the authorities’ opinion in approving this project in the first place.  
Having discussed the possible early warning signs of some of the problems which may rise during the 
project, we will explain in the next section, how the identification of these signals can be an aid to 
decision making for project responsibles. 
4. How identification of early warning signs can be an aid to decision making  
According to Nikander (2002), two stages of assessing the future are included in early warning 
utilization. First the severity, likelihood of materialization and time available of the potential problems 
should be analysed, based on the view point of the evaluator, and second the decision maker should 
examine the impact of the planned responses on the project, and the reactions, and responses of the 
various project parties and /or outsiders in the situation at hand. Nikander (2002) suggests a decision 
support model of early warnings, including 6 stages, which will be briefly described here. The first stage 
is detecting the early warning signs. In the second stage, the observer interprets the signs in order to 
decide whether it is an early warning sign or should be rejected due to its insignificancy. In the third 
stage, the observer tries to determine the significance of the information provided by early warning signs 
for the project.in the fourth stage the observer attempts to identify the problem (risk) that has emerged as 
well as its causes based on the information provided by the early warning sign and other aspects such as 
project’s situation and environment. The fifth stage includes an assessment on the time available for 
taking the right actions. This is explored along with recognition of risks. The question in this stage is how 
much time is available for the responses requires by the problem and the level of urgency of the situation. 
This stage is also highly influenced by the project situation and environment. Finally at the last stage it is 
necessary to decide which responses are required towards the situation. 
Regarding the utilization of the decision support model of early warnings, this question may arise how 
the steps introduced in this model are related to the general risk management process. It is also possible to 
wonder about the differences between early warning sign detection and conducting a risk analysis in the 
beginning of the project. According to Nikander (2002), although the decision support model has clear 
characteristics of risk management, the contents of risk management analyses are broader than those 
made possible by information provided by the early warning approach. In fact early warnings can give 
advance notice of arising risks, but they do not provide information about the probability of occurrence of 
these risks on the project. Based on this, authors believe that utilization of this model in the front end 
stage of projects can provide a clear view towards many possible problems which may arise in the future. 
Although the early warning signs of many risks are not possible to be detected in the front-end stage of 
the project, e.g. mainly technical issues, but the ones which can be detected provide a strong basis for 
decision making due to the adequate available time prior to the occurrence of the real problem and thus 
providing a high possibility for assessing the possible responses which can be taken in order to see if the 
project will or will not reach its purposes under the realized situation.  
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In case of the Norwegian HSR project, identification of early warning signs related to important 
aspects of the project such as market conditions, environmental effects and different stakeholders’ 
opinion about the project can highly assist the main decision makers of this project in order to first 
investigate if the project shall start at the first place and to what level the project’s objectives will be met 
in case of execution. Table 3 presents an example of the actions which may be taken in case of 
Norwegian HSR project, following the 6 step procedure which was defined above. We Believe that 
although the final results of the Norwegian HSR project feasibility study claim that this project is fully 
feasible, the early warning signs of several serious problems which were discussed in the previous 
section, have been overlooked and the probability of the project not reaching its goals , in case of 
execution, should be taken under consideration. 
Table 3. Decision support model steps for an environmental issue in Norwegian HSR project 
Decision support model Steps Example from case of Norwegian HSR project 
Detection of EW signs 50% of routes are underground  
Interpretation of signs in order to approve or reject it as an 
EW signs 
A serious EW signs due to high CO2 emissions it will cause 
Determination of the significance of information provided 
by the EW signs, for the project 
Highly important due to its contradiction with the main purpose of 
the project : an environmental friendly means of transportation 
Identification of the possible problems (risk) as well as its 
cause based on the information provided by EW signs 
Hazardous environmental effects caused by construction of tunnels. 
Main cause is large amount of mountains and rocks in the defined 
routes. 
Assessment of time available for taking the right action Prior to the start of planning phase 
Decision on responses required towards the situation Possible alternative routes / alternative means of transportation 
5. Conclusions and areas for further research 
In this article we have clarified the link between early warning identification and decision making in 
the front-end stage of projects. The case of Norwegian High speed railway was used as an example of a 
real project in its front end stage. We endeavored to identify the possible problems and their early 
warning signs based on the knowledge extracted from the document analysis done on the published 
assessments of the feasibility study on this project alongside semi structured interviews with the project 
manager of the feasibility study. Our findings show that although early warning signs of a vast group of 
problems are not possible to be identified in the front-end stage, but the ones which are possible to be 
detected, can highly contribute to making major decisions such as level of feasibility of the project at the 
first place and the extent to which its objectives can be met. 
We may conclude that in general, identification of early warning signs in the front-end stage can give 
more insights for the managers to choosing the right concept and making more effective decisions. 
Although the uncertainty is at its highest level, the possible early warning signs which may be detected 
can predict, in many ways, the project’s future conditions. Note that both the low cost of changes and the 
rather large amount of available time for taking preventive/corrective actions can be a great aid for 
making the right decisions. 
We plan to move forward our future research by testing how identification of early warning signs in 
the front end stage of projects can practically influence the overall performance of projects. This can be 
done on following up a real case and evaluating its performance in all its stages. 
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